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ABSTRACT
The impact of government social and labor market institutions on economic outcomes have
generated a great deal of attention by economists and policymakers in the U.S. and in other nations.  The
theoretical model suggests that there are trade offs of higher levels of  economic outcomes with more
equity-producing labor market institutions.  This study examines the impact of national levels of
unionization, strike levels,  public policies toward labor, and the structure of collective bargaining within
a  nation on a country’s foreign direct investment (FDI).  As an additional test of the relationship of labor
market institutions and state labor market policies and economic outcomes, we examine the empirical
relationship with the economic growth of U.S. states.  Examining 20 OECD nations from 1985 through
1995 and all U.S. states from 1990 to 1999, our statistical analysis shows that higher levels of industrial
relations institutions are usually associated with lower levels of FDI and slower economic growth for U.S.
states.  However, within the context of the model the results do not necessarily suggest that a nation or
state would be better off trading social equity through fewer restrictive industrial relations institutions for
higher levels of economic growth.
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“It (exchanging equity for efficiency) is,  in my view, our biggest socioeconomic tradeoff, and it plagues
us in dozens of dimensions of social policy. We can’t have our cake of market efficiency and share it
equally.”
Arthur M. Okun, 1975, p.2.
Introduction
The impact of government social and labor market institutions on economic outcomes have
generated a great deal of attention by analysts and policymakers in the U.S. and in other nations.   An
integral part of the issue has been determining the appropriate level of labor market institutions.   A
central question has been what is the impact of labor market institutions on the potential equity versus
efficiency trade-off in the economy that Arthur Okun referred to in the above quotation (Okun, 1975)?  
Recent comparative analysis of the effect of labor market institutions on economic efficiency has stated
that a holistic approach to institutions, one that includes not just a single factor but a whole group of
laws and customs, should form the basis of the ranking of these labor market institutions (Freeman,
2000).    In one of the models that Richard Freeman presents, he assumes that there are tradeoffs
between different types of labor market institutions and economic outcomes.   However, in other
examples there is assumed to be multiple equilibrium with many different levels of labor market
institutions leading to optimal levels of economic efficiency.  Within these alternative models trading
efficiency for equity (e.g., reducing income inequality) is small.  For example,  large increases in equity
are associated with small changes in efficiency as evaluated through measures of investment or
economic growth. 2
Recent studies on this issue have found contradictory theoretical and empirical results.  A
theory-based analysis shows that there is much controversy about the kind of industrial relations
institutions that encourage foreign direct investment (FDI), with higher levels of centralization of labor
market institutions leading to greater levels of FDI (Leahy and Montagna, 2000).  Empirical work using
U.S. states as the unit of observation shows there is considerable variation in the estimates of the impact
of state labor policies on measures of economic growth, but that greater restrictions are associated with
some declines in economic outputs (Autor, Donohue, and Schwab, 2000).    In contrast, other studies
find that higher levels of overall labor market institutions have no impact on economic outcomes at the
state level (Block, Roberts, and Clarke, forthcoming).  However, an analysis of the decline in the level
of U.S. labor market institutions over time shows that they impact income inequality (DiNardo, Fortin,
and Lemieux, 1996).   Consequently, not only is the direction of the impact  important, but also the
elasticity of labor market institutions and its effects on economic outcomes of interest in determining the
role of labor market institutions on economic outputs (Hatzius, 2000).
This study examines the economic impact of labor market institutions that affect wages, benefits,
and the “voice” of workers in the labor market as well as policies that influence the allocation of labor. 
Specifically, we focus on the impact of national levels of unionization, strikes, bargaining structure,
voice-related public policies toward labor such as  works councils, and the level ( i.e. plant, industry or
national) at which collective bargaining takes place within a nation on foreign direct investment (FDI).  
As an additional test of the impact of labor market institutions, we examine the effect of state labor
market policies on various measures of economic growth for U.S. states.   In our cross-country analysis
we assume and model that FDI in a country takes place relative to investment in the host nation and in1 There are many additional reasons or other labor-related factors that affect FDI beyond the ones we could
quantify.   Therefore, we also did some qualitative investigations by tape recording in-depth discussions with multi-
national chemical manufacturing managers in two companies using a structured set of questions.  In addition, faculty
and Ph.D. students in Austria interviewed managers of similar companies in Germany.  The dominant factors in the
interviews for FDI were the opportunities in the product market in other countries.  However, several of the managers
in one U.S. chemical firm stated that they had an “artificial intelligence” system or equation where the industrial
relations structure had explicit weights in the decision-making.  U.S. firms we interviewed saw labor costs and
restrictions in their ability to allocate labor resources within an establishment or company as an  impediment to
efficiency that had to be counterbalanced by economic returns in the product market.  
Other insights that were gained from our interviews with auto and chemical executives for the EU were that
EU managers were envious of the low levels of unionization and the ability to hire and fire workers in the U.S. 
Moreover, one auto executive mentioned that FDI was used  to put pressure on local German unions by building
new plants in low union and low wage regions of the U.S.  These interviews suggest that the economic opportunities
offered in the U.S. to E.U. nations appear to be relatively more attractive than the potential profits offered to
American firms in the E.U.  Although corporate decision- makers on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean view labor
costs as only a moderately important item, restrictions in Western Europe seem to encourage outflows of  FDI and
discourage investment by Americans.
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other developed nations.  Consequently, we examine foreign investment between nations and over time. 
Since we do not have measures of FDI for our U.S. state level measures, we specify estimates which
include outcomes such as gross state product, employment, and per capita income.
Labor-related factors such as methods of wage determination, strike activity, unionization,
mandated works councils, and other restrictions on management’s ability to allocate labor have often
been mentioned by business executives as important factors causing reductions in a firm’s willingness to
invest in a country1.   The recent focus by groups concerned with the growth of international trade and
investment have stated that nations which compete for international capital are growing more concerned
about developing and maintaining the appropriate economic climate for the growth and maintenance of
good jobs.  Since these factors together can be considered as an industrial relations system, we
develop a single measure to capture these elements into one variable consistent with the approach taken
by John Dunlop (1993).   In this paper we examine the role of the industrial relations climate for those
nations deciding where to invest funds.  We gather and use information on foreign direct investment4
outflows in countries with the fewest labor market restrictions relative to countries where labor market
restrictions are much more widespread and limiting for management.  We also attempt to provide
evidence on the role of these institutions for U.S. states.  Although there has been much recent research
examining the determinants of U.S. investment in other countries, there has been little work comparing
the investment levels of the host relative to the receiving nation (Cooke, 1997, Cooke and Noble,
1998, and Cooke, 2000 and Bognanno et. al, 1998).  Moreover, there also has been little research on
the role of labor market institutions on economic growth across U.S. states (Bartik, 1985, Block,
Roberts, Ozeki, and Roomkin, 2001). 
While any one industrial relations factor may be important for a particular organization, these
factors taken together as an industrial relations system may provide the underlying latent variable that
will influence these economic decisions.  The concept of an industrial relations system has been one of
the basic tenants of this field dating to the mid 1950s with publication of John Dunlop’s Industrial
Relations System in 1960 (1993).   An overarching concept within the model was the view that parts
and elements of labor/management relationships and related public policies toward labor are
interdependent and may each affect other elements and the outcomes of the system as a whole
(Dunlop, 1993).   Sumner Slichter noted that “ arrangements in the field of industrial relations may be
regarded as a system in the sense that each of them more or less intimately affects each of the others so
that they constitute a group of arrangements for dealing with certain matters and are collectively
responsible for certain results (Slichter, 1955).”  Within this approach,  public policies, bargaining
structure, and unionization would all have a prominent role to play in understanding the role of labor
market institutions.  Consequently, any attempt to quantify the impact of industrial relations should be5
taken in total rather than as a variable holding the other factors’ constant.  The interactions of these
variables would be more important than each factor by itself.  Unfortunately, statistical approaches that
use overall contextual variables are rare and as a result the systems approach has not been tested
regarding its relationship to economic outputs.  In a manner similar to the estimates of the factors that
affect firm performance, a single independent factor may not matter, but together the industrial relations
system may affect economic outcomes (Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1998). 
This study develops further the theory and rationale for using foreign direct investment (FDI)
decisions in both the host and receiving nation, and we discuss the role of the industrial relations system
on FDI.   The model shows that firms and nations that take advantage of opportunities to invest abroad
will base those decisions in part on the costs of the industrial relations system.  Further, our analysis of
states also assumes the industrial relations system impacts economic outcomes.  
Theoretical Background of Firm Investment Decisions in Foreign Countries
In order to develop a model of the role of labor market institutions on economic outcomes, we
model a Nash efficient bargaining solution between labor and the owners of capital and include the
impact of labor market institutions, which in our model is the industrial relations system, as the
determinant of bargaining power.  
At time period 0 a firm invests capital based on their profit maximization condition.  Then at
time period 1 the firm bargains the wage contract with workers.  If the bargain succeeds, the firm
produces products at their full capacity and pays bargained wage w*, which is determined by the
industrial relations system.   Otherwise,  it will fall back to its threat point production *f(k,1) and pay w0
to those workers willing to work at their reservation wage (Budd and Wang,  2001).  * is the fraction
indicating sub-optimal production due to the quantity or quality of workers, which also is determined by
the industrial relations system.6
The bargaining problem at time period 1 is
(w - w0)
"(B - B0)1-"    subject to B = f(k,1) - w ( k is a sunk cost)   (1)  
, kw Max
Where      w: Wage
                 w0 :  Reservation Wage
                  k  : Capital
                 B   :  Profit
                B0   : *f(k,1) - w0 where 0 # * < 1
           f(k,1) : Production function. Labor is normalized
            fN >0 , fO < 0 
           0 # "  # 1
Then the solution is w* = "(f(k,1) - B0) + (1-")w0                                                 (2)
At time period 0 the rational firm uses this negotiated wage w* to decide on the optimum investment by
maximizing profits  B = f(k,1) - rk - w.
 f(k,1) - w - rk                                                                                               (3)
k Max
we substitute w with w* then
 f(k,1) - "(f(k,1) - B0) + (1-")w0 - rk                                                             (4)
k Max
 or
 (1-")(f(k,1) - w0) + "B0 - rk
k Max
The first order condition is
(1-")f(k*,1)N +  " *f(k*,1)N - r = 0                                                                           (5)
k* solving the first order condition is the optimum investment for the firm at time 0.7
From here we obtain
   









This implies that when a company makes investment decisions among locations which are  identical
except for the industrial relations system (") , it will invest more where the industrial relations system
restrictions are fewer from management’s perspective.
A Game Theoretic Approach when the Industrial Relations System Provides Equity
The theory, thus far, has focused on the economic output aspects of FDI.   In this section we
extend the model to explicitly include the equity effects of industrial relations institutions (IR). We
propose that  countries also consider the industrial relations system to be an important determinate of
the social stability of a nation.  For example, industrial relations institutions affect income distribution,
employee voice in the political system, and crime, which are all presumed to be elements of social well-
being  (Rees, 1963, Freeman, 1994, DeNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996,).  Consequently, a country
may not want to engage in maximization behavior for only FDI at the expense of reducing the benefits
of having a well-developed industrial relations system.  We model how countries may consider both the
industrial relations system and outputs of the economy through the level of FDI and chose an optimal
amount of each “good.” 
Following a general game theoretic approach for an optimal level of labor market institutions
and its relationship to efficiency we expand upon these models to include two major players (Freeman
and Lazear, 1995, and Levine, 1995).    We initially assume that there are only two countries or blocs
of countries A and B (e.g. the U.S.A. and the E.U.),  and five strategies, which conform to a standard
Likert scale,  with increasing values regarding the restrictiveness of the  industrial relations system. The
lower values give management greater bargaining power.  
 The payoff is constructed  as follows: Uf is the additional FDI, Uc is the additional social benefit
from implementing a specific IR system ( e.g. greater worker voice or bargaining power resulting in
more social stability).   The industrial relations system is allowed to differ between countries and is8
nonlinear.  In Appendix 1 we solve for the equilibrium levels of both FDI and IR systems using a Nash
equilibrium approach.  We also give examples of outcomes under conditions of efficiency but with no
social benefits as a consequence of an industrial relations system in the Appendix Table 1A.  In
addition, we provide the case where there are explicit tradeoffs of equity and efficiency in the Appendix
Table 1B.   The optimal solutions show that there are two pure Nash equilibrium solutions [(1,1) and
(5,5)] in our model, which are all at the extremes of either the FDI or IR ranges.  The examples
provided from this  model suggest that there can be multiple equilibrium levels of trade-offs of equity for
efficiency.  Consequently, any further examination of this issue requires data gathering and empirical
analysis.    
The Structure of the Industrial Relations System 
In order to quantify the industrial relations system for a country or a state,  we assume that there
is an underlying structure for the system that cannot be captured by any single variable, which is
consistent with industrial relations theory.  Further, we also assume that there is an underlying structure
that goes from a lenient industrial relations policy to a more restrictive one from management’s
perspective. We further hypothesize that there is a structure to the industrial relations system which is
linked in a hierarchical manner and provides a natural scaling of industrial relations characteristics in a
nation.   The degree or intensity with which those characteristics are implemented in a country forms the
basis of firm decisions to invest in that nation.  In order to operationalize  this structure of the industrial
relations variables, we create latent variables for the industrial relations factors in each nation and for
each state in the U.S.  Each individual factor in the industrial relations system was divided into five
categories to resemble a Likert-type scale, and they are categorized from lowest to highest in terms of
their restrictiveness to employers.   In order to examine the robustness of the impacts of this variable we
develop two alternative measures.  In the first case we use a summated rating scale of industrial2Direct investment capital flows are defined as “equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other capital
associated with various intercompany debt transactions” and comprised about 8 percent of international capital
flows (Lipsey, 2001).
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relations system variables which include extent of union coverage, days lost due to strikes per 1000
employees per year, the degree of bargaining centralization and level of bargaining structure, and the
extent of employee voice (Calmfors and Drifill, 1988 and Traxler and Kittel, 2000).   This summated
rating scale is an additive one that measures the intensity of each of the factors and aggregates these
factors into one variable (Bartholomew, 1996).  An alternative latent variable measure is the Rasch-
type model that places each of the variables within a logical structure. The empirical measure of the
Rasch model we use is known as a partial credit model.  This approach assumes that the distance
between parameters is equal and that the categories are equal integers (Wang, 1996).  Although we
obviously do not include all of the factors that might go into a fully specified structural industrial relations
system variable, we think that we can capture the major institutions which likely impact industrial
relations and economic outcomes.
Measuring Foreign Direct Investment
Firm-level investment is assumed to be an economic measure that is highly responsive to the
institutional characteristics of the firm, which includes unionization  (Hirsch, 1991).  By extension we
anticipate that this would also apply to national labor market institutions.  Even if FDI has some
measurement problems in capturing “pure gross investment,” it does enhance the economic prospects
within a country by, at a minimum, moving resources to their optimal use  (Lipsey, 2000)2. 
Analyzing investment patterns across countries assumes that companies are responsive to the
economic characteristics of the home country relative to opportunities in the host country. 10
Consequently, our measure of foreign direct investment used in hypothesis testing is total direct foreign
investment from the ith country to the jth divided by the total foreign investment in the ith nation, and this
is consistent with other analysis of economic and industrial relations factors that impact U.S. FDI
(Cooke, 2000).   The use of this measure of FDI allows us to capture the relative flows of FDI
between two nations based on economic differences and variations in institutions, such as the industrial
relations system in a country.   However, given this construct, countries like the U.S., which has a large
share of other countries’ FDI would usually comprise a disproportionate share of FDI just by virtue of
its economic size.   Nevertheless, this is generally perceived to be a better measure of the flows of FDI
than using total expenditures or gross inflows, which would have an even greater bias toward large
nations and have a greater potential for heteroskedastic error terms.  Our analysis includes 20 OECD
countries using annual data for 10 years from 1985 to 1995.  
In Appendix two the means and standard deviations of the economic and institutional variables
used in our model are presented.  The table gives measures of the industrial relations system variable
which includes both the summated rating scale and the Rasch measure.  For collective bargaining we
use national union coverage, since countries like France have “low unionization rates,” but a high
percent of coverage via the collective bargaining agreements for workers who do not belong to a union. 
Since unions and works councils both influence the ability of managers to make decisions, we use a
measure of the interaction of intensity of mandated employee representation in the country and the level
of unionization ( Freeman and Lazear, 1995, Kleiner and Ay, 1996).  We include the index value of the
“strike rate per thousand employees” in our analysis, since this variable affects the ability of
management to maintain a stable and consistent level of production for its workforce  (Beggs and3Even though there is controversy of this measure based on various definitions across countries, there is
no reason to believe the changes over time are similarly biased ( Beggs and Chapman, 1987)
4 In this context the Calmfors and Drifill index of the industrial relations system is of the degree of
centralization of bargaining, whereas the Traxler and Kittlel index modifies this index to include the coordination of
bargaining of national and local labor market objectives. 
5Each of the factors of an industrial relations system that are in each of the countries in our sample are
scaled by the intensity of use of those factors. A higher value means that a factor would reduce the likelihood that
FDI would occur in a particular nation.  If there is a single dimensional ordering for the four industrial relations
system variables, no country would have a  more advanced or intense level of a policy without also having a lower
practice. Our data fits this pattern reasonably well, but not perfectly.  For example, nations that have high levels of
union coverage are more likely to have most of the other practices, and 12 nations have this practice with at least one
other high intensity practice, which is the highest value for all the system factors.    No other industrial relations
system variables have more other high intensity levels of industrial relations coverage.  Values generated using
factor analysis found that all of these factors were highly intercorrelated, except for strike intensity, which had a
negative factor loading.      
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Chapman, 1987).3   As part of our measures of the industrial relations system, we present the level of
bargaining centralization and coordination which reflects whether there is establishment, local or national
wage bargaining in a manner developed by both Calmfors and Drifill (1988) as well as a subsequent
study by Traxler and Kittlel (2000)4.   The last two columns of the Table show measures from
management’s perspective of the summated rating scale and the Rasch scale for each of the countries’
industrial relations system.  The summated rating scale ranges from a high of 20  for Australia to a low
of six for the United States.  Our industrial relations system values use a hierarchical scaling system and
we find results which are consistent with this scaling5.  Since there is no overriding statistical or
theoretical reason to use one approach over the other, we present both in most of our analysis.
Statistically, these measures of the industrial relations system are highly correlated.  For  the composite
index measure we found that Cronbach’s alpha measure of the inter correlation of the industrial
relations variables was .81, which was beyond the acceptable statistical threshold (Nunnally, 1978). 
In order to specify a model to capture the impacts of the industrial relations system on FDI we12
specify a reduced form model.  The Data Appendix 2  shows a clear variation in the types of labor
market institutions in the U.S. versus E.U.  countries.  The U.S. epitomizes the “free” labor market from
management’s perspective, since both union membership and coverage are low, and other
governmental institutions that restrict managerial behavior also are minimal.  If there is an equity versus
efficiency trade-off for investors,  having lots of industrial relations institutions would be associated with
more FDI going to the U.S. and away from E. U. countries.  In addition to many of the standard
controls found in studies of FDI,  we include the tax rate of the receiving country  relative to the host
country in order to control for potential tax treatment effects. We  use data from the OECD volume on
“Taxing Profits in a Global Economy” ( OECD, 1992).  Since we assume that countries with similar
industrial relations systems may want to invest in nations that have complementary systems, we control
for this interaction by adding a dummy variable for whether the sending and host nation has the same
quintal industrial relations system using the summated rating scale.
Extensions of the Model to U.S. States 
Unfortunately, we do not have measures of outcomes, like FDI, at the state level, which are
highly responsive to economic and institutional incentives.  We do, however, use a  similar approach to
analyze the impact of the industrial relations system on U.S. states.  One advantage of  examining U.S.
states is the reduction in unobserved heterogeneity in customs, English -speaking language, common
legal framework, and standard capital markets relative to examining cross-national FDI. Yet,  there is
still considerable variation among the states for measures such as unemployment benefits, minimum
wages, disability payments, right to work laws, and levels of unionization.  Using a latent variable
approach similar to the one we used to examine FDI,  Richard Freeman developed an index of social13
legislation favorable to labor from a “composite worker protection index” and gathered data from
various government sources.  We have modified this index to include industrial relations factors and
structured it to fit into a summated rating scale index that captures the systems approach, yet differs by
providing the scale from managements’ perspective (Freeman, 1986, Spector, 1992).  In this model
levels of economic outcomes follow a standard function as specified in the equations one through six,
but the capital market is assumed to be the same across U.S. states.  Instead of  measures of FDI, our
estimates include gross state product, employment, and per capita income.  Although there is no
agreement as to of these factors is the best measure of economic outcomes, we examine all of them to
determine whether there are trade-offs between equity and economic outcomes across all these
measures as robustness checks of our estimates.   Our state level controls for economic factors that
vary across states include the log of population, overall tax rates, and the log of manufacturing
employment in the state.  Since the price of capital is assumed to be  the same across U.S. states there
is no control variable for this measure.  The benefit of using this unit of analysis is the ability to difference
out unobservables that are not easily accomplished by attempting to estimate international differences in
economic outcomes.  Moreover, the state data within the U.S. gives evidence and serves as an
additional check on the ability to generalize these findings to other political entities.
In Appendix Table 3  we give the basic values for the state level analysis.  This table presents
the means for the basic changes in state output, employment, and per capita income for the time period
we analyze.  These IR variables include labor union coverage density and measures of labor regulations
such as unemployment insurance coverage, workers’ compensation coverage, and minimum wages. 
Again, we find a high correlation for the measures of the industrial relations variables which comprise14
our industrial relations system measure.  The Cronbach’s alpha, which  measures the inter correlation of
the industrial relations variables or consistency,  was .85,  and this is beyond the acceptable threshold
(Nunnally, 1978) 
Industrial Relations Institutions, Income Inequality, and FDI
     In Figure one we show the basic country relationships between our measures of industrial relations
institutions and income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient in panel A and the ratio of earnings
of persons in the 90th percentile relative to those at the 10th percentile in panel B.  Our measure of the
industrial relations system is the summated ratings’ value for each nation.  Consistent with findings in
other studies,  the slope of the line is negative, suggesting that  the impact of more numerous and more
intense levels of labor market institutions are associated with less inequality in the country (DiNardo,
Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996).   Of course, analysis with greater controls and econometric modeling may
change the basic relationship. Nevertheless, this result is suggestive of the basic equity- efficiency trade-
off of the impact of industrial relations institutions suggested by Okun in the opening comment to this
paper.
Figure 2 presents the basic relationship between FDI outflows to other countries as a
percentage of total outflows from the U.S. in panel A and from Germany in panel B for 1990, the
midpoint of our data analysis.  The vertical axis shows the percent of total FDI outflow that goes to
other nations and the horizontal axis presents the nation’s industrial relations summated rating scale. 
Estimates for the U.S. show a modest negative slope in panel A, but there is a much steeper negative
slope for Germany in panel B.  Perhaps countries like Germany with more restrictive industrial relations
systems are more likely to choose to invest in countries with less rigid institutions, as our interviews with6 Since there is some controversy about the use of  PPP for normalizing economic variables, we estimated
models using both adjusted and unadjusted values and found qualitatively similar results.  
7 This approach estimates the coefficients using  OLS and their standard errors with corrections to allow for
heteroskedasticity, cross-panel heteroskedasticity and panel specific autocorrelation.  In our model the number of
cross-section observations is larger than time series ones. Consequently, we can not use GLS with this error
structure. As a result we used panel corrected standard error estimates found in several econometrics software
packages (Stata, SHAZAM, Limdep).  For more details about this econometric approach  see Beck and Katz(1995)
and Greene(2000) .
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German executives suggested.   These results, however, fail to control for many of the covariates  that
are likely to affect FDI.
Estimates From the FDI Model
Table 1 gives reduced form panel corrected standard error regression estimates of the equation
specified above using yearly data for the countries in our analysis.  This specification is consistent with
the theoretical  model using industrial relations as a determinate of FDI.   In columns one and two we
give the linear specification of both the summated rating scale and the Rasch estimates.  In columns
three and four we present the quadratic form of the specification by giving the linear and squared term
for both the summated rating scale and the Rasch estimates.   We have year by country effects on FDI,
and our sample size of  2442 observations are based on  i to j movements of FDI with adjustments for
purchasing power parity (PPP) for the specific country6.  We use reduced form panel corrected
standard error estimates with three- year moving averages for the economic variables as a statistical
smoothing technique, but the use of yearly averages without smoothing shows similar qualitative results.7 
The values of FDI are the outflows as a percentage of overall FDI  to the countries in our sample.   We
also estimated a similar model using FDI inflow as a percentage of all FDI to the nation and found
basically the same qualitative results as presented in Table 1.  In Appendix 4 we present random effects8 Estimates were made of F-levels for each of the equations with and without the industrial relations system
variables.  We found that the F-level for column 1 was 7.20 and for column 2 was 8.15, each of these values are
statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence level.  We also estimated these equations with the lag of FDI and
they showed similar results. 
16
specifications of our basic model and find similar results to those shown in Table 1.  Further, analysis
for large trading blocs of countries like the U.S. and E.U. show similar qualitative results for the impact
of industrial relations variables on FDI  (Kleiner and Ham, 2000).        
The economic variable controls included in our model of FDI are yearly measures of education
using percent of the workforce having completed high school, nonpublic sector compensation
differences between the two countries, interest rate differences, gross domestic product per capita,
imports minus exports divided by gross domestic product, relative tax rate, measures of industrial
relations complementarity, and the unemployment rate.  These variables largely capture the variables in
our theoretical model for the role of market factors that affect FDI.  Other factors which are constant
over time include whether the nations with FDI outflows had the same native language, and the distance
in miles between the capitals of the two countries8.  Our measures of the industrial relations system
remain relatively constant over time, since there were small changes in most of the relative components
of the variables, although measures such as the strike rate and union density showed some variability. 
Nevertheless, the use of one variable to capture the industrial relations system, the use of yearly
economic data, and controls for capital markets should provide more consistent estimates of the overall
impact of labor institutions on FDI flows. 
The results show that the summated rating scale and the Rasch measures of the industrial9When available we used the percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
However, when this information was not available we used the percent belonging to a union in the country, and
denoted this with a dummy variable in our statistical analysis (Little and Rubin, 1987).
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relations system are statistically significant in all of the specifications, and negatively related to FDI.9  In
the quadratic specifications the squared term is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that there
is a positive or at least a flattening out of the negative relationship between the industrial relations system
and FDI.   These general results are similar to ones found for the impact of labor variables for U.S. FDI
outflows (Bognanno et. al., 1998, Cooke and Noble, 1998, and Cooke, 2000).   Moreover, the
coefficients for the other control  variables are consistent with other studies of FDI that focus on the
effects of taxes or exports and imports  (Summers, Gruber, and Vergara, 1993, Engen,and Skinner,
1996, Blonigen and Davies, 2000).  
In order to test for the robustness of our results in panel A of Table 2 we also estimated the
equations in Table 1 dropping one of the measures of the industrial relations system variables and then
examining the results.  The estimates seem robust to dropping an element of the overall value of the
latent variable.   In panel B we estimate the direct effect of each of the elements of the  industrial
relations system on FDI and find that bargaining centralization, strikes, and mandated employee
representation is all statistically significant on their own.  It appears that the overall  industrial relations
system construct matters rather than any one variable, and there is a complementarity with the variables
in our overall latent variable index.  To further proxy a potential “fixed effect” for a country that changed
their industrial relations institutions, we saw that large changes in labor market institutions occurred in
New Zealand during the 1990s.  In that country-specific case, there were more business- sponsored
industrial relations policies implemented which resulted in large gains in imports and growth in foreign10A country that moved in the other direction in terms of implementing more stringent levels of industrial
relations institutions was South Korea.  This nation had few industrial relations institutions in 1985, but greatly
increased the number and kinds of collective bargaining-related policies during the late 1980s and 90s.
11 We also estimated the model using state exports and found qualitatively similar results.  However, upon
further examination we found that the state exporter of record is not necessarily where the product was produced. 
Further, the state of production is not neccesarily the exporter, but rather the point of shipment state gets credit for
the state of export.  For all these reasons we decided against reporting these results given the major potential errors
in variables problems.
12Estimates using the Rasch approach showed similar statistically significant results. These estimates are
available from the authors. Estimates using end of period IR system variables showed similar results.
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capital  (Blumenfeld, Crawford, and Walsh, 2001).10
Beyond FDI activity, however, these industrial relations variable institutions seem to have
produced narrowing levels of wage and income dispersion within countries (Freeman and Katz, 1995,
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996 ).   Consequently,  the effect of industrial relations institutions may
be to reduce the ability of managers to allocate resources, but the benefits to workers through greater
voice and labor standards for all employees may be worth the costs to a nation through less foreign
investment.  However, from our game theory examples, countries may choose higher levels of industrial
relations institutions, which they see as optimal from a social perspective, even though it means lower
levels of FDI.
U.S. State Level Evidence on Measures of Economic Outcomes
Table three shows estimates of our state level model of the impact of the IR system on
measures of state economic growth, which includes employment change, change in per capita income,
and gross state product.11  We present two sets of econometric results.  In Panel A we show the
estimates for changes from 1990 or 1993 to 1998 or 1999 using all 50 U.S. states, with the summated
rating scale index for the beginning year.12   Panel B we show the impact of the industrial relations13We do not include a quadratic specification because the U.S. is at the lowest end of the IR system values. 
Consequently, there would be little variation among the states in comparison to the wide variance in national IR
systems.   
14Estimates using an F-test for the significance of all the individual variables shows that the industrial
relations variables are statistically significant for employment changes with an F-value of 2.55 for the cross-section
estimates from 1990 to 1999 and a Chi-squared value of 15.14 for the pooled time-series cross-section estimates.
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variable using year by year results from 1990 or 1993 to 1998 or 1999 using panel corrected standard
error regression estimates with a sample size ranging from 400 to 450.  In Appendix 5 we give
estimates from a random effect econometric approach to estimating our model and the results are
similar to those in Table 3.  The estimates of the industrial relations variables in both sets of
specifications are robust for all the measures of economic outcomes using the pooled cross-section-
time series results and for most of the change in economic variables from 1990 to 199913. The
interpretation of the variables is that a one unit change in the IR system is associated with a .05  percent
reduction in the growth rate of state per capita income.14   These estimates for states are consistent with
firm level analysis using aggregate latent variable measures of human resource practices on productivity
(Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1998).
The consistency of the measures of economic outcomes for international comparisons of FDI
and state-level comparisons of economic growth are similar.  For firms seeking profit-maximizing
investments, labor costs and the ability to allocate labor in the most efficient manner possible appears to
have an impact on key measures of economic outputs.   These results are consistent with our game
theory simulation, which says that states may choose lower economic growth for the social gains of a
more equitable labor market.
Counterfactual Simulations for Countries and States15Estimates using the Rasch approach for the coefficients for the industrial relations variables produced
similar results for both international and state level estimates.
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 Table 4 gives the results of a simulation for both international FDI, and for changes in state per
capita  income.  In this model we use the coefficients from the regression estimates from Tables 1 and 3
and estimate the impact of changes from a country or state that has the lowest values of their industrial
relations system as measured by the summated rating scale relative to the other  more intense
institutional arrangements in other countries or states15.  These results can be thought of as a
counterfactual estimate of the impact of a change in the industrial relations system on  measures of
economic outcomes relative to the one with the lowest level of these labor market institutions.   In panel
A we show the effect of the countries in our sample adopting the same industrial relations system as the
U. S. on FDI.    The results for the top five and bottom five affected nations show that annual FDI
inflow would be increased by more than 2 percent per year for Japan if they adopted the U.S. IR
system.  In contrast, this assumed change to a U.S. industrial relations system would increase FDI
inflows from the nations in our sample by almost 10 percent per year for Australia,  the country with the
highest level of industrial relations-related benefits.  Panel B presents the state level estimates.  The
estimates show what the impact would be on other states of a change from the industrial relations
system in Arizona, the state with the lowest worker-related benefits, relative to the five top and bottom 
U.S. states.  The results range from no change for a state like Mississippi to a growth of almost one
percent per year in per capita income per year  for  Alaska and by .72  percent for Connecticut,
Maine, Michigan and New Jersey.  Worker protections and related institutions are important to the
overall state social safety net, as well as for employee well- being.  However, they appear to come at a21
price of reduced growth in per capita income.
Conclusions 
This study has examined the impacts of the industrial relations system on direct foreign
investment, as well on measures of economic growth for U.S. states.   We implement a systems
approach, rather than using individual variables to examine the role of industrial relations on the amount
of direct foreign investment in the destination nations.  We state the rationale for this latent variable
method using industrial relations theory, rather than using a single variable or a group of individual
variables.  Our theoretical model suggests that nations with higher levels of industrial relations reduce
returns to capital within a Nash model.  Further, using a game theory approach shows that nations can
have multiple equilibrium when both FDI and industrial relations system voice and equity factors are
considered. The measures that we use seem to fit into this systems approach and include measures of
unionization, strike activity, centralization and level of bargaining, and mandated employee involvement. 
The data and time period for our study includes 20 OECD nations for the ten years 1985 through
1995, as well as 50 U.S. states from 1990 to 1999.  
Linear and quadratic estimates from the reduced form model, which is consistent with theory,
show that the industrial relations system is statistically significant and of moderate size in the
specification of the systems variable.  Moreover, developing a counterfactual estimate using our model
and the industrial relations system coefficients, shows that a movement from a country with institutions
like Australia to the U.S. would diminish the host nation’s FDI by almost 10 percent per year. 
However, the transactions cost of changing an industrial relations system is presumably high, although
countries like New Zealand and South Korea have done so with some economic impacts.22
In contrast to some previous analysis our results suggest further that multinational firms in more
developed nations tend to be somewhat sensitive to the industrial relations climate, preferring ones that
provide management with a greater amount of leeway in allocating labor and setting standards at work. 
Of course public policies must consider more than foreign investments by large firms and their choice of
the kinds of an industrial relations and social climate they wish to provide employees.  Giving workers
an environment where they have a greater say at the workplace with higher wages and benefits may be
worth the reduction in foreign investment which is the unintended consequence of these policies. 
However, policy makers and interest groups need to be aware of the efficiency consequences of their
constituents’ equity concerns (Okun, 1975, Freeman, 2000).  Further examination using more nations
and time periods with changers to different systems, as well as using more microeconomic data and
field interviews of executives and other employees, may complement the  insights into this issue which
can be provided by this  large- scale analysis using aggregate data.23
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Figure 1. Industrial Relations System Relationship with the Gini Coefficient and Percentile Ratio 90/10
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Figure 2. FDI Outflows and  the Industrial Relations System Relationships  in 1990
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.0815 * .0842 * .0913 * .0928 *
(.0324) (.0309) (.0333) (.0312)
.0205 .0228 .0253 .0250
(.0190) (.0186) (.0176) (.0162)
.0009 * .0010 * .0009 * .0010 *
(.0003) (.0003) (.0004) (.0003)
-.0045 * -.0047 * -.0057* -.0051 *
(.0008) (.0008) (.0012) (.0011)
-.0003 -.0005 -.0013 -.0010
(.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007)
-.0021 -.0022 -.0016 -.0011
(.0014) (.0013) (.0014) (.0012)
-.0092 * -.0095 * -.0106* -.0100 *
(.0032) (.0029) (.0025) (.0029)
.0065 .0033 .0004 -.0006
(.0043) (.0043) (.0038) (.0042)
-.1165 -.0131 -.0446 .0141
(.3081) (.2985) (.3062) (.2853)
.0031 * .0030 * .0035 * .0031
(.0014) (.0014) (.0016) (.0016)
.0267 -.0280 .4095 .0370
(.1050) (.1057) (.1080) (.0902)
No. of Observations 2442 2442 2442 2442
R
2
.035 .037 .039 .041
Note
* Significant at 5% level
Table 1. Panel Corrected Standard Error Estimates of the Impact of the Industrial Relations System  on the Percent of Total 
Net FDI Outflows (1985 - 1995)**
Unemployment Rate
****














***Average over Various years
****  Three Year Moving Average (1983 - 1995)
Constant




** Standard Errors in Parenthesis and all results include year dummies. 33

























Table 2 Responsiveness of the FDI Model to Alternative Specifications: Impact of the Industrial Relations 
System  on the Percent of Total Net FDI Outflows (1985 - 1995)
1
Host Country IR System                        
(Summated Rating)
Host Country IR System                        
(Summated Rating)
Host Country IR System                        
(Summated Rating)
Panel A
Host Country IR System                        
(Summated Rating)











.0026 -.0124 * -.0191 * -.0120 -.0299 *
(.0046) (.0046) (.0084) (.0076) (.0054)
Note
* Significant at 5% level
1 Standard Errors in Parenthesis and all results include same control variables as in Table 1.
Panel B :Individual Variable Impacts34
Gross State Product
2 -1.39 * -6.45 * -.17 * -.76 *
(.61) (2.22) (.04) (.15)
Per Capita Income -.32 * -1.49 * -.05 * -.21 *
(.20) (.74) (.01) (.05)
Employment -1.11 * -4.22 * -.11 * -.39 *
(.35) (1.29) (.02) (.06)
3 The industrial relations system variable uses a summated ratings scale ( See Freeman 1986)
1
 All regressions include constant and control variables;high school graduation rate, log of per capita tax revenue, 
log of population and manufacturing employment.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. Economic Data is from the BLS 
and BEA Website
* Significant at 5% level
2Gross State Product includes only data through1998
IR Rasch3 IR SR3
B. % Change over a Year (Panel 1990-1999)
Table 3.  Estimates of the Impact of the Industrial Relations System on Economic Outcomes for U.S. States
1




Change in FDI 
(SR)
Change in FDI 
(Rasch) Country
Change in FDI 
(SR)
Change in FDI 
(Rasch)
Australia 9.69% 13.84% Switzerland 5.54% 9.76%
Denmark 8.99% 13.03% United Kingdom 4.15% 8.35%
Norway 8.99% 13.03% Canada 4.15% 8.35%
Austria 8.99% 13.03% Japan 2.08% 5.67%
Italy 8.30% 12.35% Korea 1.38% 4.45%
State
Change in Per 
Capita Income 
(SR90)




Change in Per 
Capita Income 
(SR99)
Change in Per 
Capita Income 
(Rasch90)
Alaska 0.86% 1.49% Tennessee 0.09% 0.24%
Connecticut 0.72% 0.98% Texas 0.09% 0.24%
Maine 0.72% 0.98% Georgia 0.05% 0.15%
Michigan 0.72% 0.98% Louisiana 0.05% 0.15%
New Jersey 0.72% 0.98% Mississippi 0.00% 0.00%
Table 4. Simulated Impacts of Switchings the IR System on Economic Outcomes from the Country/State with the 
Lowest IR Value : 5 Highest and Lowest Rated Values
Panel A.   Country-Effects : Changes in % Annual FDI
Panel B.   State-Effects : % Changes in Annual  Per Capita Income36
5 0 0 0 0
5 5 5 5 5
5 4 0 0 0
0 4 4 4 4
5 4 3 0 0
0 0 3 3 3
5 4 3 2 0
0 0 0 2 2
5 4 3 2 1






Appendix 1A.   Normal   Form   Game   When   the   Payoff   is   FDI
B
A
1 2 3 4 537
6 1.5 2.24 3.34 5
6 6 6 6 6
6 5.5 2.24 3.34 5
1.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
6 5.5 5.24 3.34 5
2.24 2.24 5.24 5.24 5.24
6 5.5 5.24 5.34 5
3.34 3.34 3.34 5.34 5.34
6 5.5 5.24 5.34 6
5 5 5 5 6
5
Appendix 1B. Normal  Form  Game  When  the  Payoff  is  Sum  of  FDI   and  Utility  from  IR  Equity
B
A


























Australia 19,665 15,806 -0.002 8.16 11.33 8.51 88.50 20 0.76
(2423) (3216) (.01) (1.07) (2.33) (1.55)
Austria 22,553 19,818 -0.054 7.13 7.39 5.05 85.02 19 0.58
(3776) (5939) (.01) (1.11) (0.83) (0.66)
Belgium 29,403 19,676 -0.013 6.79 8.61 11.12 79.10 16 0.14
(5591) (5846) (.03) (.47) (1.14) (1.52)
Canada 25,411 18,503 0.024 8.48 9.54 9.56 70.28 12 -0.45
(3827) (2548) (.01) (1.58) (1.03) (1.35)
Denmark 20,469 23,779 0.006 7.17 9.51 9.87 98.91 19 0.58
(3187) (6019) (.03) (.92) (1.39) (1.58)
France 25,772 19,596 -0.007 7.89 9.15 10.41 73.62 14 -0.14
(3560) (4901) (.01) (1.04) (1.40) (1.04)
Germany 23,733 19,515 0.032 6.41 7.17 7.82 87.35 17 0.28
(3070) (6685) (.018) (.47) (0.83) (1.08)
Greece 13,309 7,567 -0.125 7.75 19.82 8.21 78.23 18 0.43
(1294) (2007) (.02) (3.91) (2.29) (1.08)
Italy 23,904 23,274 -0.010 7.09 12.09 9.95 52.62 18 0.43
(3429) (5521) (.02) (.79) (1.26) (1.09)
Japan 23,352 26,724 0.022 8.11 5.21 2.54 93.60 9 -1.04
(3788) (8764) (.01) (1.55) (1.07) (0.35)




















Korea 12,116 4,688 -0.024 -3 13.54 2.75 85.50 8 -1.31
(3818) (1990) (.01) (1.52) (0.62)
Netherlands 26,213 18,301 0.022 7.11 7.24 7.12 73.81 16 0.14
(3725) (4871) (.02) (1.41) (0.95) (1.21)
New Zealand 15,860 12,241 0.002 9.64 11.72 6.97 -
3 17 0.28
(2006) (2544) (.02) (1.79) (3.86) (2.50)
Norway 22,620 25,773 0.043 6.47 10.45 4.33 76.35 19 0.58
(4118) (5490) (.03) (.64) (2.43) (1.55)
Portugal 12,001 6,801 -0.123 7.93 18.72 6.17 31.22 14 -0.14
(2301) (2725) (.04) (1.94) (5.29) (1.64)
Spain 22,860 10,720 -0.052 8.25 12.15 20.05 63.55 15 0.00
(3718) (3593) (.01) (1.94) (1.45) (2.73)
Sweden 22,057 22,829 0.020 6.42 10.92 4.04 80.75 18 0.43
(3229) (4972) (.02) (1.40) (1.43) (2.72)
Switzerland 29,586 31,031 -0.024 6.85 5.03 1.90 84.56 14 -0.14
(5161) (8049) (.02) (1.09) (0.93) (1.76)
U.K. 22,281 15,459 -0.025 6.98 9.58 9.10 78.20 12 -0.45
(3062) (3417) (.01) (.84) (1.29) (1.99)
U.S. 29,627 23,032 -0.019 7.51 7.91 6.34 72.32 6 -2.29
(3800) (3367) (.01) (1.59) (1.29) (0.78)
3 Not Available
Appendix 2. Summary of Economic and Industrial Relations System Variables by Country (1985-1995) (continued)*
* OECD Statistical Compendium Unless Otherwise Specified
1 Average over Various Years (International Education Indicators)






















Alabama 90 19 3,844 4,230 2,233 394 67 9 -1.4
Alaska 24 26 875 596 367 19 87 25 4.2
Arizona 97 21 9,361 4,219 2,255 203 79 6 -2.9
Arkansas 50 18 1,764 2,459 1,356 256 66 11 -0.9
California 914 25 91,772 31,502 17,354 2,004 76 16 0.2
Colorado 104 25 9,572 3,681 2,418 206 84 13 -0.5
Connecticut 116 32 11,834 3,275 1,986 301 79 22 1.8
Delaware 26 26 4,446 713 447 64 78 16 0.2
Florida 329 23 19,720 14,080 7,529 513 74 10 -1.2
Georgia 191 22 8,927 7,126 4,155 587 71 7 -2.2
Hawaii 36 25 252 1,166 745 21 80 21 1.4
Idaho 24 19 1,652 1,140 656 76 80 15 0.0
Illinois 344 25 29,501 11,820 6,780 977 76 21 1.4
Indiana 141 22 11,826 5,760 3,346 672 76 10 -1.2
Iowa 69 21 2,725 2,830 1,776 252 80 17 0.4
Kansas 63 22 4,348 2,571 1,605 200 81 12 -0.7
Kentucky 87 19 5,818 3,832 2,092 312 65 13 -0.5
Louisiana 108 19 4,117 4,308 2,193 194 68 7 -2.2
Maine 27 20 1,402 1,240 718 100 79 22 1.8
Maryland 135 27 3,493 4,996 2,807 190 78 16 0.2
Massachusetts 191 28 14,984 6,064 3,712 474 80 21 1.4
Michigan 239 23 36,578 9,616 5,115 969 77 22 1.8
Minnesota 127 25 12,567 4,582 2,978 434 82 19 0.9
Mississippi 51 17 1,255 2,673 1,349 257 64 6 -2.9
Missouri 132 22 6,222 5,300 3,192 430 74 12 -0.7
Montana 17 19 335 851 498 28 81 15 0.0





















Nebraska 42 22 2,195 1,627 1,073 112 82 9 -1.4
Nevada 46 25 717 1,502 956 37 79 14 -0.3
New Hampshire 31 25 1,669 1,145 684 109 82 12 -0.7
New jersey 262 29 18,569 7,943 4,369 523 77 22 1.8
New Mexico 39 18 1,268 1,650 872 50 75 9 -1.4
New York 586 28 43,536 18,121 9,760 1,006 75 20 1.1
North Carolina 184 22 11,242 7,136 4,331 860 70 14 -0.3
North Dakota 14 19 530 638 413 22 77 14 -0.3
Ohio 281 23 22,442 11,103 6,279 1,107 76 20 1.1
Oklahoma 68 19 2,466 3,256 1,808 181 75 10 -1.2
Oregon 78 22 8,463 3,105 1,839 244 82 21 1.4
Pennsylvania 304 24 17,283 11,998 6,493 983 75 22 1.8
Rhode Island 25 24 1,029 994 546 89 72 22 1.8
South Carolina 82 19 4,880 3,691 2,050 376 68 9 -1.4
South Dakota 17 20 454 720 463 45 77 9 -1.4
Tennessee 127 21 8,797 5,195 3,101 535 67 8 -1.8
Texas 497 22 49,512 18,517 10,469 1,073 72 8 -1.8
Utah 44 19 2,649 1,942 1,139 126 85 13 -0.5
Vermont 14 21 2,579 580 363 50 81 18 0.6
Virginia 183 24 10,445 6,554 3,934 420 75 9 -1.4
Washington 148 24 29,503 5,363 3,134 375 84 22 1.8
West Virginia 34 18 1,055 1,810 833 87 66 15 0.0
Wisconsin 127 22 8,245 5,099 3,098 602 79 18 0.6
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.0951 * .0940 * .0931 * .0938 *
(.0216) (.0214) (.0211) (.0210)
.0297 .0303 * .0319 * .0313 *
(.0152) (.0151) (.0150) (.0148)
.0006 .0007 .0003 .0005
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005)
-.0038 * -.0040 * -.0046 * -.0043 *
(.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011)
-.0008 -.0010 -.0020 -.0016
(.0014) (.0014) (.0015) (.0014)
-.0011 -.0012 -.0005 -.0002
(.0019) (.0019) (.0019) (.0019)
-.0067 -.0067 -.0072 * -.0063 *
(.0037) (.0036) (.0036) (.0036)
.0052 .0026 -.0002 -.0020
(.0030) (.0032) (.0034) (.0035)
-.1210 -.0380 -.0182 .0547
(.1688) (.1711) (.1697) (.1723)
.0036 * .0033 * .0034 * .0028
(.0016) (.0015) (.0015) (.0015)
.0230 -.0229 .3806 .0658
(.0848) (.0765) (.1431) (.0818)
No. of Observations 2442 2442 2442 2442
R
2                 
 Within .001 .001 .001 .001
                 between .194 .208 .216 .225
                 overall .042 .045 .047 .050
Note
*Significant at 5% level.
Appendix 4. Random Effect Estimates of the Impact of the Industrial Relations System  on the Percent of 
Total Net FDI Outflows (1985 - 1995)
**



















Three Year Moving Average (1983 - 1995)
*** Average over Various years





2 -1.39 * -6.45 * -.12 * -.54 *
(.61) (2.22) (.03) (.10)
Per Capita Income -.32 * -1.49 * -.06 * -.24 *
(.20) (.74) (.02) (.06)
Employment -1.11 * -4.22 * -.06 * -.21 *
(.35) (1.29) (.01) (.05)
3 The industrial relations system variable uses a summated ratings scale ( See Freeman 1986)
* Significant at 5% level
1
 All regressions include constant and control variables;high school graduation rate, log of per capita tax 
revenue, log of population and manufacturing employment.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. Economic Data is 
from the BLS and BEA Website
2Gross State Product includes only data through1998
Appendix 5. Random Effect Estimates of the Impact of the Industrial Relations System on Economic Efficiency 
for U.S. States
1
A. % change between1990-1999 B. % Change over a Year (Panel 1990-1999)
IR SR
3 IR Rasch
3 IR SR
3 IR Rasch
3